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Introduction
In the eighteenth century, farmers were viewed as the ideal Americans.1 Thomas
Jefferson was particularly influential in spreading the ideal of the yeoman farmer. He argued that
farmers “who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God” and had a “substantial and
genuine virtue.”2 Jefferson argued that farmers were the model American citizen, “the purest
representative of the finest people on earth…the health of the republic depended” on them; this
idea was popular because, as Richard Hofstadter argues, the population “consisted
predominantly of literate and politically enfranchised farmers.”3 Their jobs were seen as truly
necessary because they produced food, which separated them from other workers; this was an
idea that became the center of cultural conflict in the 1980s. Those who believed in the yeoman
ideal also argued that farmers “had simple tastes, abhorred artificiality, luxury, and ostentation,
and were honest and straightforward.”4 By the rise of the Populist Party in the 1890s, farmers
were still seen as defined by their independence and their heightened morality, although these
traits were seen in a less flattering light and interpreted as evidence of their backwardness. The
stereotypes about farmers remained relatively stable over time, but whether or not they were
perceived as positive or negative depended on the circumstances of the time period.
These stereotypes would continue to define the identities of farmers in ways that would
be harnessed to gain public support during the 1980s farm crisis. Men often had deep pride in
their ties to the land and their professed individualism, which was part of the reason the crisis
had such a profound psychological effect. Women were able to recognize the role of the family
See David Danbom’s Born in the Country: History of Rural America and Richard Hofstader’s
The Age of Reform: From Bryan to FDR for an examination of the symbolic role of farmers in
America.
2
Danbom, Born in the Country, 67.
3
Dabom, Born in the Country, 66; Hofstader, Age of Reform, 29.
4
Danbom, Born in the Country, 67.
1
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and community in a farm’s success; this was reflected in their activism. Farmers relied heavily
on the idea that their work was different from other types of work; it was a lifestyle, not a job.
These arguments were bolstered in films like Country, which contained themes of “endangered
rural life marked by family, tradition, and agriculture that was quickly vanishing” and which
Ronald Reagan described as “a blatant propaganda message against our agri programs.”5 The
destabilization of the 1980s was the continuation of a trend decades in the making.
The 1920s saw the beginning of a turn towards mechanization in farming that would be
re-emphasized after World War II. David Danbom describes this as a “productivity revolution”
that caused the numbers of farmers to shrink as the need for labor continued to decrease over the
following decades.6 The populations of rural towns also shrunk, which was a consistent worry
during the farm crisis, when article after article described the slow deaths of small towns. The
farm crisis worsened many of the human costs of the productivity revolution, but it did not cause
them. At the time, it was widely believed by farmers themselves, as well as academics, that the
farm crisis was a contained event, only weakly impacted by historical trends.
The effects of the productivity revolution on farming can be seen in the agricultural
census. There were 188,952 farms in Minnesota in 1945, 131,163 in 1964, and 98,537 a decade
later.7 Between 1982 and 1992, the number of farms in Minnesota dropped from 94,382 to
75,079.8 As of 2017, there were 68,822.9 Farming was significantly changed by the crisis;
although there are still far more family farms than corporate ones, the numbers are heading in
Rebecca Stoil, “Desperate Farm Wives: Gender, Activism, and Traditionalism in the Farm
Crisis,” Middle West Review 2, no. 1 (2015), 40, 38.
6
Danbom, Born in the Country, 235.
7
United States Department of Agriculture, “Minnesota,” in 1969 Census of Agriculture
(Washington, D.C., 1972), 2, agcensus.library.cornell.edu/census_parts/1969-minnesota/.
8
USDA, “Minnesota,” 10.
9
United States Department of Agriculture, “Minnesota: Historical Highlights,” in 2017 Census
Volume 1, Chapter 1: State Level Data (Washington, D.C., 2019), 7.
5
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opposite directions. Farms became larger under fewer farmers. Small towns also suffered as they
could not retain younger generations.
The crisis itself has no official start and end date; secondary sources choose their own,
but most agree that it began sometime in the late 1970s and ended sometime in the early-to-mid
1990s. In the 1970s, farmers were told by Earl Butz, Richard Nixon’s secretary of agriculture, to
“plant ‘fencerow to fencerow’ and…‘get bigger, get better or get out.”10 Between 1974 and
1978, there was an increase of over a hundred farms, which reflected the good times of the
decade; it seemed as if all the “decades of hard work and frugal living were at last going to be
rewarded.”11 This resulted in many lenders pushing larger loans on farmers.12 One activist
reflected that
loans officers often encouraged them to expand, encouraged them to make huge
investments…Loan officers apparently were oblivious to the fact that the crops weren’t
bringing in enough income, or to the fact that the debt income was mounting, or that high
interest rates would bring down the whole house of cards. Once everything collapsed the
lenders wanted to crawl out of the picture and blame it all on the farmers.13
This perspective was expressed by many farmers, who were tired of being the only ones blamed,
although most agreed that both lenders and farmers were responsible. Large loans and unbridled
encouragement of expansion were the fuel for the crisis. The Carter administration’s grain
embargo of the Soviet Union is generally regarded as striking the match, as “farmers were
suddenly carrying more debt than they were worth and had no way to make it up” which caused

10

Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 23.
United States Department of Agriculture, “Minnesota State and County Data,” in 1997 Census
of Agriculture (Washington, D.C., 1999), 10, agcensus.library.cornell.edu/census_parts/1997minnesota/; Kathryn Marie Dudley, Debt and Dispossession: Farm Loss in America’s
Heartland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 21-22. At no other time was there an
increase of farms from a preceding census.
12
See Gerald Hagaman’s interview by Margaret Robertson for the Minnesota Farm Advocate
Oral History Project on November 22, 1989.
13
Pat Franey, “Henningson Speaks Out On Farm Crisis,” Morris Weekly, February 27, 1985, 5.
11
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“massive waves” of foreclosures.14 Although Carter was the primary president blamed by
farmers for their situation, the crisis worsened under the Reagan administration. Reagan was
“generally hostile,” saying that he would “rather export the farmers and keep the crops” and
viewed support programs as unnecessary spending.15 This resulted in a veto of the 1985 Farm
Bill and closing “the lender of last resort,” the Farmers Home Administration.16
One effect of the productivity revolution was a shift in how people perceived farming.
Traditionally, farmers saw it as their lifestyle — both an inheritance and something that they
were called to do, much like a minister. By the 1980s, people had begun to see it as a job like any
other. Farmers typically held a mix of both views, such as the farm advocate who said that he
would “like to think of [farming] as a way of life, but you have to face reality that it's a real
business,” but it was still more common for it to be seen as a lifestyle.17 This framework
impacted views of foreclosure, since losing an ancestral home is different from losing a business.
Although farming had always been competitive, cannibalization — the swallowing up of smaller
farms — increased during the farm crisis and caused much bitterness within rural communities.18
As the cultural position of farming shifted during the crisis, the clash between job and
lifestyle was highly visible. One local example occurred after an attempted foreclosure on the
Langman farm near the University of Minnesota Morris campus, which will be discussed later.
Michael Stewart Foley, “‘Everyone Was Pounding On Us’: Front Porch Politics and the
American Farm Crisis of the 1970s and 1980s,” Journal of Historical Sociology 28, no. 1 (2015):
110.
15
Foley, “Everyone Was Pounding On Us,” 115; Donald Drescher, interview by Margaret
Robertson, Minnesota Farm Advocate Oral History Project, MNHS, April 18, 1989, 9. For an
exploration of how Reagan’s policies affected recent Hmong immigrants, see Cecilia Tsu’s 2017
article “‘If You Want to Plow Your Field, Don’t Kill Your Buffalo to Eat’: Hmong Farm
Cooperatives and Refugee Resettlement in 1980s Minnesota.”
16
Daniel Levitas, The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right (New
York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2002), 281.
17
Drescher, interview, 11.
18
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 16.
14
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UMM student Lori Halverson first recounted the events of the protest in the campus newspaper
with little personal perspective, focusing on Jesse Jackson’s speech.19 However, the editor-inchief, Kathy Kuntz, fired back in the next issue, arguing that although Groundswell and Jesse
Jackson felt the farm crisis “was a good vs. evil issue,” farmers were at least partially to blame
for their own misfortune.20 Speaking generally about farmers, not the Langmans specifically,
Kuntz argued that “like so many other Americans these farmers prefer free government money to
the old fashioned kind you have to sweat for,” and accused them of being poor businessmen. She
was firmly in the camp that farming was another type of job.
Farmers had historically been seen as the most independent group of workers, but were
now being scorned as overly dependent on government support. Many farmers tried to distance
themselves by deriding those farmers as failures who should quit while they still had their
dignity. They had also been seen as beacons of civic virtue, but though they tried to harness that
belief in their style of protest, the broader culture did not always respond. This shows the
flexibility of stereotypes around farmers, since both farmers and non-farmers could use historical
and inverted versions to attack groups they did not like. Halverson had assumed the lifestyle
framework was the default perspective, since that had historically been true. Although she did
not respond to Kuntz, it seems unlikely that she expected the response her article received. These
women were not alone in their beliefs about the role of farming; their writing lacks the polish of
professional writers and therefore clearly reveals the bones of the argument beneath. This
division would continue to grow in rural communities during the 1980s and beyond.
Undergirding most of these arguments were beliefs about welfare, which took center
stage in national politics during the Reagan administration. Rarely would the “welfare queen” be
19
20

Lori Halverson, “Save Rural America,” Morris Weekly, April 10, 1985, 1.
Kathy Kuntz, “The Farm Crisis — A Complex Issue,” Morris Weekly, April 17, 1985, 2.
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directly mentioned, but the idea that people receiving assistance from welfare programs were
different from people who were not was an underlying assumption, as Kuntz’s argument
reveals.21 One farmer said that he thought activists who participated in tractorcades were the
same as “the guy that goes up to the welfare office to collect food stamps in his new Cadillac.”22
The interviewer later noted that “even farmers who enroll in commodity programs feel
compelled to express disdain for those who cannot farm without more government ‘handouts.’”23
Welfare was seen as shameful, which meant that many people who needed assistance, such as
food stamps, would not apply for the programs. Parents were an exception; one farmer reflected
that “if you want to feed your kids you take food stamps.”24 Farmer Juanita Buschkoetter said the
same thing: she applied for food stamps against her husband’s wishes because she was deeply
concerned about her ability to feed her children.25 Welfare was rarely explicitly mentioned, but
beliefs about it formed the base on which conversations about the farm crisis were built.
Sociologist Kathryn Marie Dudley argues that “the lessons of hard times are not
restricted to those who live through them.”26 Families and whole communities, not just
individuals, were scarred by the farm crisis. Those who were then children are now adults with
children of their own; like those who lived through the Great Depression, they are passing on the
lessons they learned. Many people did feel they had lost their way of life, which affected their
political outlooks. All farming organizations supported Reagan in the 1980 election because of

For a discussion of these building blocks of the welfare queen, see Carly Hayden Foster’s
2008 article “The Welfare Queen: Race, Gender, Class, and Public Opinion.”
22
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 96.
23
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 100.
24
Paul Levy, “Dreams Broken, Crushed in Lincoln County,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune,
May 4, 1986, 5.
25
The Farmer’s Wife, PBS, aired 1998, YouTube video, 1:38:41,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HaYTtE1B_o.
26
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 10.
21
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Carter’s grain embargo; though Reagan ended up worsening the crisis, resentment towards
Carter remained much stronger. Extremism worsened during the crisis and laid the groundwork
for the militia movement. Lessons learned at the time still guide rural people’s thinking today.
This paper will discuss three broad categories of responses to the farm crisis. Each comes
from farmers’ impulses to maintain control over their livelihoods, though they were not equally
common. First is suicide; this was a common response, particularly from men. It was often
caused by a feeling of crushing responsibility for their farm and to their family. Second is
religion, which informed farmers’ relationship to their land and community. Christianity was
tightly woven into daily life and affected several types of responses, including withdrawal from
churches and an increase in activism. Activism was the third response, uncommon but highly
publicized. There were multiple strains, with differing attitudes on the usefulness of working
within or fighting against the system. Most focused on practical solutions, although extremist
groups were less grounded in reality, negatively affecting their success.
Gendered Suicide
One of the primary ways farmers and their families responded to the farm crisis was
through suicidal ideation. The highest rate of farm losses in a single state was in Minnesota in
1984 and 1985, after the “worst drought in 50 years” in 1983.27 Rates of interpersonal violence
went up during the crisis, but the rise in suicides gained the most attention, particularly two that
followed murder sprees.28 Suicide was both gendered and stigmatized. It did not affect men,
women, and children equally, but all groups were touched by the stress of the crisis and the fear
of losing their family members.
Patricia Riney-Kehrberg, “Children of the Crisis: Farm Youth in Troubled Times,” Middle
West Review 2, no. 1 (2015), 6; Paul Klauda, “Three Farm Families / Agriculture Presented
Challenge in ‘83,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, January 23, 1984, 3B.
28
Michael Stewart Foley, Front Porch Politics (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), 215.
27
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The 1983 Ruthton murders committed by James and Steven Jenkins, and the 1985
murders committed by Iowan Dale Burr deeply impacted Minnesotan farmers. James and his 18year-old son killed bank president Rudolph Blythe and loan officer Deems Thulin; James later
shot himself and Steven was arrested. Dale Burr killed bank president John Hughes, neighbor
Richard Goody, his wife Emily, and himself. Both men targeted bankers because they were at
risk of foreclosure. It is debatable if the murders were caused by the farm crisis, but both
activists and newspapers believed they were.29 James Jenkins was turned into “a hero,” which
one attorney said was because “a lot of people thought Jenkins was as much a victim as the
bankers.”30 One farmer being foreclosed on by the same bank said “So many farmers are going
down the tubes, someone was bound to crack,” placing himself and Jenkins in the same
position.31 He felt that something may have been different about Jenkins, which is why he killed,
but that his stress stemmed from the crisis; death by suicide was common among farmers.
These were the only two murder-suicides connected to the farm crisis; both occured in
places where violent death was rare. The Ruthton murders were the first in the county in over a
century.32 Violence did not feel rare at the time; one couple remembered that the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA) official they worked with “was afraid that somebody was going to shoot
him…[and a] farmer tried to run him over with a tractor.”33 In a review of Louis Malle’s 1985
documentary God’s Country, Nick Coleman explained that the “fear of violence is in the air
29

Joseph Amato convincingly argues in his 1988 book When Father and Son Conspire: A
Minnesota Farm Murder that the crisis was not the reason for the Ruthton murders; rather, a
sense of being a failed man was. James Jenkins was considered a poor farmer by his community.
Similar complexities emerge with the Burr murders, though less academic attention has been
paid to them.
30
Levy, “Dreams Broken,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 14.
31
Andrew Malcolm, “In Farm Crisis, the Land Itself Becomes a Liability,” New York Times,
October 9, 1983, E5.
32
Levy, “Dreams Broken,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 14.
33
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 121.
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because violence is being done to a way of life.”34 Regardless of their actual causes, the murders
felt like the natural progression of tension and were thus interpreted through the lens of the farm
crisis. In doing so, the complexity of the situations and people involved were flattened to the
point of stereotyping.35 Although the murders that drew attention, newspapers focused equally as
much on suicide; other murders were only hypothetical, suicide was actually happening.
The possibility of losing one’s farm was one cause of suicide. Foreclosures were
traumatic; it felt like the bedrock of life was crumbling away because “land was not just dirt in
which to grow crops, but a measure of social status, family pride, and often an inheritance passed
down through generations.”36 Agricultural educator William Nelson said that even families who
found that leaving farming was a better course of action than staying were “dragged kicking and
screaming off [their] farm” and “it was just awful” to watch the ones who were forced off try to
figure out what to do.37 When they lost their farm, families lost their place in their community.38
Another farmer said it could be compared to “someone telling you you have a terminal illness.
At first you’re angry then ‘No, why me,’ and finally you come to the realization it’s not anything
I personally did…and once you’ve quit you’ll never get back to the farm again.”39 This grief
over the possibility of losing his farm and the idea that his children would not inherit it was
shared by the vast majority of farmers, though many did blame themselves.

Nick Coleman, “Ch. 5 Films a Moving Farm Story,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, April 21,
1986, 2.
35
See Catherine McNichol Stock’s 2017 book Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American
Grain.
36
Riney-Kehrberg, “Children of the Crisis,” 6.
37
William Nelson, interview by Margaret Robertson, Minnesota Farm Advocate Oral History
Project, MNHS, June 2, 1989, 33, 40.
38
For an in-depth exploration of shame during the crisis, see Kathryn Marie Dudley’s
anthropological study of ‘Star Prairie,’ Minnesota, in Debt and Dispossession: Farm Loss in
America’s Heartland.
39
God’s Country, directed by Louis Malle, aired 1985, 1:20:27.
34
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Teenagers and children were at the lowest risk of suicide. However, children experienced
a lack of control that contributed to their stress that the state of Minnesota recognized by
designing youth-targeted mental health programs.40 In addition to these programs, the vast
majority of surveyed teens worked to support their families through off-farm jobs, just as their
mothers often began to do.41 Although off-farm work shifted internal family dynamics in a way
that may have increased stress, being able to monetarily contribute may have decreased dual
senses of being helpless and being a burden. A sentiment commonly expressed among
interviewed farmers was that there was no future in farming, and many teenagers agreed with
that sentiment. Youth flight from rural areas was consistently remarked upon, and gaining skills
off of the farm may have given teenagers the belief that they could build a different future.
Like adults, children feared losing their homes, but they additionally feared losing their
parents. A recurring motif in the dreams of teenagers at the time was “huge, noisy trucks coming
to haul away not only the family’s goods but also the parents.”42 Teens feared their parents
would commit suicide, which was worsened by a parental refusal to discuss struggles with their
children. “It’s scary to see your folks scared,” one teenager reflected.43 Teens wanted
information to dispel the sense that their family was “the only one in the ‘whole world’ that was
experiencing this hardship.”44 Fear of parental suicide manifested in many ways, such as a

40

There has been no analysis of gender divisions of suicide among children during the farm
crisis. Boys and girls were raised with different expectations of their future relationships to the
land, but it is unclear how or if this impacted their risk of suicide; Riney-Kehrberg, “Children of
the Crisis,” 6.
41
Riney-Kehrberg, “Children of the Crisis,” 13.
42
Andrew Malcolm, “Families Fail Along With Their Farms,” New York Times, January 4, 1987,
E5.
43
Wendy Wall, “Growing Up Afraid: Farm Crisis is Taking Subtle Toll on Children in
Distressed Families,” Wall Street Journal, Nov 7, 1985.
44
Eric Ramírez-Ferrero, Troubled Fields: Men, Emotions, and the Crisis in American Farming
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 45.
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teenage boy refusing to answer the phone because he was afraid “that the caller will want his
father and that he will find the man a suicide out in the barn.”45 He could not prevent his father
from taking his own life, but he could control his own response to it through this seeminglyirrational action. Adult men were presumed to be stoic and yet their suicide rates were high,
contributing to a sense that the world was unstable.
Statistics on suicide are problematic. Despite “suicides and suicide attempts appear[ing]
to be on the rise,” the precise number of intentional deaths is unclear.46 Due to a cultural taboo
and payout restrictions on life insurance, many probable suicides were recorded as accidents.
The few statistics reported in newspapers focus on adults; only in rare cases were children
included. However, children do seem to have attempted suicide much less frequently than adults
and suicides of men were much more frequent than women. Among sixty-six verified cases of
farm suicides in Oklahoma that included three minors, over three-fourths of the total were men.47
Suicide was an escape from the cultural shame of failure, which fell more heavily on
adult men than any other group. They were culturally expected to bear the most responsibility for
keeping the farm functioning, and this pressure is seen throughout accounts of men’s suicidal
ideation. One suicide note was simply the word “responsible” written over and over on the last
page of his diary.48 Another farmer directly connected the grief of foreclosure to suicide, saying
that since men were not culturally allowed to cry, “some of them couldn’t cry. They ended up
down in the barn and hung themselves.”49 It was difficult for men to envision a future that did
not involve farming. Men not only felt unable to cry, but unable to communicate their troubles in

Malcolm, “Families,” E5.
Eileen Ogintz, “Emotional Crisis Grips Rural America,” Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1985, 3.
47
Schneider, “Rash of Suicides,” A13.
48
Schneider, “Rash of Suicides,” A13.
49
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 126.
45
46
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any way, sometimes even to their wives. To talk about the problem was to admit failure; this was
particularly true for men whose farms had been passed down through generations of their family.
Farmers nationwide tended to believe that hard work would be rewarded with success, so
those who failed had not worked hard enough. This cultural belief was weakened by the crisis,
for those facing foreclosure and not, in the same communities.50 This widened the circumstances
under which it was acceptable to seek help. Culturally-enforced silence was consistently pointed
to as a key factor in suicide. Farm advocates attempted to address this by giving struggling
farmers a way to talk about their problems in hotlines and peer-counseling groups.51 They were
not limited to emotional support, often providing legal advice as well.
Although men were seen as primarily responsible for the farm, women also faced
responsibilities that could become overwhelming. An element left out of most narratives around
farm suicides is that women attempt suicide “three or four times” more than men do.52
Accounting for this would still leave a gap between male and female suicides, but it reveals the
pressure on women. Though most interviewees agreed that the fear of losing one’s farm was
harder on men than on women, both perceived foreclosure as “moral failings of the deepest
kinds: hers as a wife and homemaker, his as a husband and father.”53 Women felt able to ask for
help in a way that men did not, since it did not undermine their gender role. They did not feel the
shame of failure with the same intensity, which likely explains the lower rate of suicidal ideation.

Joan Blundall and Emilia Martinez-Brawley, “Whom Shall We Help? Farm Families’ Beliefs
and Attitudes About Need and Services,” Social Work 36 no. 4 (1991), 317.
51
Bev Strom, “Report From Heartland: Farm Crisis Getting Worse,” Los Angeles Times, January
18, 1986, 2.
52
Andrew Malcolm, “Deepening Financial Troubles Taking Emotional Toll on Midwest’s
Farmers,” New York Times, June 15, 1983, A14.
53
Ramírez-Ferrero, Troubled Fields, 44.
50
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Suicide was a common response to the farm crisis, particularly among men. It was
located in a feeling of shame and failure that originated in the pride farmers took in their land
and work. All members of farm families were at risk because of cultural pressure to keep
financial problems within the family; withdrawal from other family members was also common.
Teenagers were able to find new ways to help their families and stabilize their identities in a way
their parents struggled with. Suicide was linked to violence, as stress and grief over the future
loss of a farm and all that meant increased. However, despite the disproportionate amount of
attention paid to it by media, murder was exceedingly rare. James and Steven Jenkins and Dale
Burr reveal the common feeling that violence was just around the corner, but the rarity of their
actions also reveals that violence was typically kept within the family or internally directed.
Christianity
Farmers’ relationship with their land was influenced by the Christian belief of human
dominance, as well as a sense that they were enacting a family legacy through their work.
Religion also guided the relationship between farmers and their community. Farmers’
relationship with the church as a social institution could be fraught during the crisis. It could
influence people towards activism and give them a sense of support, but a more common
response was withdrawal from the church altogether. Ministers tried to decrease this through a
turn towards activism that included running support hotlines. Not all denominations reacted in
the same way but primary sources rarely specify to which they are referring, so this paper refers
to Christianity as a whole.
There was a strong belief among farmers that farming was a calling. Although farmers
stressed their independence, particularly when compared to other types of jobs, they viewed
themselves as a link in a long chain rooted in the land. One end of that chain was held by God,
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and the other by a distant unborn descendant. This was reflected in a saying from the time, “It
may not be God’s country, but you can see it from there.”54 Farmers’ work allowed them a
proximity to the beauty of the divine, even on Earth; it was a good life. When they inherited the
land, they made a promise to continue the work of their fathers and grandfathers. This was made
explicit in advertisements targeted towards farmers, which sometimes showed “a ghost image of
a father or grandfather mirroring the actions of the present-day farmer.”55 While this generational
relationship provided an anchor to the land, it could quickly become an added weight during the
crisis. As one farm wife put it, “you feel like all the ancestors are there watching everything you
do, from generations back. And if you fail, you’re failing all the family.”56
Generational connections made the land more than a place. This was repeatedly stressed
across a variety of sources, including those interviewed for the Minnesota Historical Society’s
Farm Advocate Oral History project. Not only was the land no longer just “someplace to leave,”
it was “in our blood.”57 The land structured the family, since “it gives birth to [kinship] and it
symbolizes it, and figuratively and often literally, it entombs it.”58 Although not all farmers
expressed their belief in explicitly religious terms, many viewed the land as a gift from God. It
was their responsibility to make the raw landscape productive through their own skill as part of
the “Biblical injunction for man to exercise dominion over the earth,” though no interviewees
framed their relationship with the land in terms of dominance.59 This foundational belief in
Levy, “Dreams Broken,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 1. This is where Louis Malle’s
documentary, God’s Country, takes its name. It is clear that Christianity has a strong presence in
Glencoe.
55
J. L. Anderson, “‘You’re a Bigger Man’: Technology and Agrarian Masculinity in Postwar
America,” Agricultural History 94, no. 1 (2020), 15.
56
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 130.
57
Anne Kanten, interview by Dianna Hunter, Minnesota Farm Advocate Oral History Project,
MNHS, June 6, 1989, 3; Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 147.
58
Ramírez-Ferrero, Troubled Fields, 82-83.
59
Dudley, Debt and Dispossession, 8; Anderson, “You’re a Bigger Man,” 19-20.
54
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intergenerational relationships that developed the land was typically not outright stated. Like
Christianity, this belief was assumed to be so natural a part of life that it needed no explanation.
A belief in stewarding the land could also lead people towards activism, which is
underexplored in secondary literature on the crisis.60 As will be discussed later, activism was a
relatively rare response. However, people who became activists were responding to the same
pressures that other farmers in their communities felt, including religious ones. Both American
Agricultural Movement (AAM) member Anne Kanten and attorney Lynn Hayes were inspired
towards activism due to their childhood churches. Hayes’ mother worked with migrant workers
through their church, ingraining a belief that “the underdog doesn’t have to [stay] the
underdog.”61 As Kanten grew up, “our whole society and our community was focused around
that little rural church” which shaped her thinking for the rest of her life, particularly regarding
working in tandem with the natural processes set in motion by God.62 Like Dudley’s
interviewees, Kanten expressed a strong feeling of responsibility for the land; feeding the world
was her job because she had made a contract with God to take care of it. This is one of the
reasons that the National Catholic Rural Life Conference valued family farms above corporate
farms, since they “tended to take better care of their land and avoided wasteful land use practices
that were inefficient in the long run.”63 Although Kanten’s rhetoric of ‘feeding the world’
aligned with the view of the Nixon administration, “farm[ing] fence to fence” was not her
motivation.64
60

The majority of literature centered on religion during the farm crisis is sociological studies.
For an exception, see David Bovée’s 2016 article “The Middle Way: The National Catholic
Rural Life Conference and Rural Issues in the 20th and 21st Centuries.”
61
Lynn Hayes, interview by Dianna Hunter, Minnesota Farm Advocate Oral History Project,
MNHS, May 18, 1989, 22.
62
Kanten, interview, 3.
63
Bovée, “The Middle Way,” 782.
64
Drescher, interview, 7.
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Churches were not only religious institutions, but social ones. These were spaces where
the community could provide support for distressed members. As the farm crisis worsened, many
people attempted to find comfort in religion. Women not affiliated with a church were
“significantly more depressed” than women who were.65 This may be due in part to the fact that
churches had historically been the “only public institution in which it was usually acceptable for
them to play an active role.”66 Women benefited more from religion than men overall, although
Fundamentalist men benefited more than non-Fundamentalist men.67
Churches formed part of a support network that decreased stress and depression in
meaningful ways for farmers during the crisis. One key aspect of church support was that it was
unasked for; individuals did not need to seek it out. When forced to do so, their mental health
suffered.68 This is likely because talking about a problem was the same as admitting failure,
whereas unasked for support showed acceptance by the community. This was true across
denominations. Farmers felt deep shame about asking for help because it could not be kept
private. One strategy churches used to prevent this shame was asking community members to
submit applications for heating assistance and food stamps, regardless of need, so those who did
need them would not be singled out.69 This protected them from shame, although the material
end result was limited by requirements that tended to exclude many people who did need help.70
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Unfortunately, only 19 percent of families in one survey thought their church “actively
expressed support.”71 Before and during the crisis, Mennonite communities in Iowa were
transitioning from an inwards community-focused perspective towards an outward, globalfocused one. Like Anne Kanten, they felt called to feed the world.72 Farm problems came to be
seen as issues that should not be dealt with on a community level, which cut off an important
avenue of emotional support, since farmers did not want to discuss what they saw as their
individual failure.73 Lack of privacy exacerbated these issues, as people sought refuge by “hiding
out” and no longer participating in social spaces.74 Though the social aspect of churches could be
beneficial for farmers, it was more frequently seen as a representation of “social censure, not an
escape from it.”75 Many families withdrew from church as foreclosure loomed.
Newspaper coverage of the crisis commonly discussed the problem of people
withdrawing from church. Many farmers felt “alone in their grief” as they struggled through the
1980s.76 Some described it as “worse than during the 1930s” because everyone was struggling
during the Great Depression; people mourned a sense of lost community.77 No one knew what to
say. It was considered polite to allow struggling neighbors to save face by “pretend[ing] that
nothing is wrong.”78 This politeness had a gendered component, as it also allowed “an avoidance
of the discomfort caused by witnessing emotions deemed inappropriate for a man.”79 Community
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responses were more suited to acute crises than long-term ones. Anne Kanten found that her
church “didn’t quite know what to do” with her realization that “the church also needs to be
concerned about the people who live and struggle on that land.”80 Forty-four percent of
respondents to a survey were likewise disappointed, finding their church “not at all
supportive.”81 This caused further withdrawal. However, isolating oneself from potential support
and denying that problems existed increased stress and depression for farmers.82
People’s struggles did not go unnoticed when they withdrew from church. It, and
particularly clergy, functioned as part of a community surveillance system. No one knew for sure
who was struggling, but withdrawal from normal social life implied something was wrong.
Ministers often kept an eye on “one or two families” who seemed on the verge of drastic
action.83 Though pastors “did not wish to alienate congregants by being too activist oriented,”
newspapers were always able to find someone willing to talk.84 Newspapers typically chose to
speak to men, unless they were specifically writing about women. Activist clergy are likely
overrepresented, but there was a genuine increase in political action. As one reverend explained,
“In all faiths, they’re conscious that they’re losing parishioners, and you know what that does to
a church in a small town…they know they have to let the politicians know their people are in
great pain.”85 Most mental health outreach came from churches, and organizations like the
National Catholic Rural Life Conference were active in “counseling farmers, participating in
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protests, and calling for a moratorium on foreclosures until emergency credit measures could
take effect.”86
Religion held many meanings for farmers and shaped multiple responses to the crisis.
Farmers were deeply connected to the land by a relationship that extended over many
generations. Combined with their feelings of responsibility for it, this made foreclosures
devastating. In losing the land, they failed to continue what their ancestors started and broke a
contract with God. Community dynamics of churches were not openly discussed but emerged as
a consistent source of pain in later interviews. Standards of politeness were alienating as
congregants did not acknowledge the toll the crisis was taking on those in their midst. Farmers
withdrew from their churches, worsening their stress. Despite this, churches often played a large
role in community support and activism. They operated hotlines for mental health and kept an
eye on those who could not bring themselves to ask for it.
Activism
Activism was a relatively rare response to the farm crisis, yet received the most attention.
Farm activism had been on the rise in years prior to the crisis, emphasizing parity.87 During the
crisis, struggling farmers were drawn to many groups, including those who offered practical and
extremist solutions. Many farms were still lost and activists were often looked down on by their
neighbors for disturbing the social order, but activism provided a framework allowing farmers to
turn away from a destructive individualistic mindset.
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Jim and Gloria Langman of Starbuck, Minnesota did not respond typically when their
480-acre dairy farm faced foreclosure.88 Though they represented farmers most likely to be
affected by the crisis — “young farmers with limited capital who took advantage of optimal
credit conditions in the 1970s” — Jim was the former president of the AAM’s Minnesota
chapter.89 Rather than privately negotiate with the lender, they reached out to Minnesota farm
organizations Groundwell and COACT to plan a rally. By April 1, 1985 their foreclosure would
be delayed for the third time due to threats of violence, but the protest continued. Roughly 2,000
people showed up, including presidential hopeful Jesse Jackson, who gave a thirty-minute speech
encouraging coalition-building between farmers and other groups.90 The protest was about more
than the Langman farm; it was a protest against all foreclosures. Increasing numbers of farmers
were drawn to activism “looking for a collective solution to their problems” in 1985 as the farm
crisis continued to worsen.91 At the Langman foreclosure, protestors carried white crosses for the
counties in Minnesota, with the numbers of farms predicted to fail in the coming years written on
them; a reminder “of the nobility of taking up a battle known to be lost before it is ever begun.”92
A later part of the protest was a memorial service led by Jackson for victims of suicide; a
message that lives were being lost alongside farms. Both Jim and Jackson urged attendees
against using violence, which had been a topic of national conversation for several years.93
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Many younger leaders in farm activism drew on lessons learned by watching the civil
rights and anti-war movements.94 Rural populists came from “generations of sturdy producers
who did feel some jobs were beneath them and were ready to fight to prevent falling to the
lowest class,” but a sense of global community guided many individuals involved in farm
activism.95 AAM activist Alan Gains said that during his first tractorcade, “We thought
agriculture was the only thing oppressed, but we didn’t get very far down the road until we knew
that wasn’t entirely the case. We wasn’t in the boat alone…everybody” in the working and
middle classes was there alongside farmers.96 Jackson made the same point, arguing that
marginalized groups should work together since oppression did not stop at national borders;
“black South Africans, white Iowa farmers, and Palestinian villagers all belonged with no
pecking order of geography or suffering.”97 Farm activists typically focused on their own states,
but some kept an international perspective. Anne Kanten said her mission trips revealed the kind
of problems facing farmers in the Midwest were faced by farmers worldwide.98 This was a
relatively uncommon point of view. Many communities were suspicious of activists as outside
agitators; coalition building largely did not occur, particularly across rural-urban divides.99
There was a dark side to farm activism: “the roots of violence, racism, and hatred…have
been nourished in the same soil and from the same experiences that generated rural movements
for democracy and equality.”100 AAM had been a leading farm activist organization in the 1970s,
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but in the wake of the disappointing 1979 tractorcade, several of the founding members were
drawn to Christian Identity rhetoric that the Posse Comitatus and other survivalist groups
preached. The Posse was a non-farm right-wing organization that viewed “all of history as a
Manichaean struggle between white, divine, Anglo-Saxon Christians, and Satanic Jews” and was
particularly focused on taxes.101 In the 1990s, it would develop into the militia movement.
Violence was also present in the 1980s, when the Posse taught farmers how to build bombs
during armed survival training groups, but it mainly bubbled under the surface.102 The primary
draw was the solutions the groups seemed to offer; the worse the crisis became, the more people
attended recruitment meetings. This alliance split AAM and farm activism.
This extremist turn would be damaging for both individuals who relied on their strategies
and farm activism as a whole. By 1983, extremist groups had broadened their appeal by avoiding
explicitly violent rhetoric. As Daniel Levitas explained, “farmers with legitimate grievances lost
credibility and found themselves divided, when they should have been uniting around more
constructive efforts to pursue economic justice.”103 Other farm organizations pushed back against
their bigotry, particularly Iowa-based PrairieFire; by 1986 extremist groups faced significant
resistance, but their ideas persisted. In 1992, anthropologist Eric Ramírez-Ferrero attended an
AAM meeting where two of the national founders spoke. They urged against paying taxes and
explained farmers “have been placed in the role of servitude” by the government; the audience
took them seriously, making Ramírez-Ferrero feel like “I was at some sort of Klan meeting.”104
Despite the pushback, their ideas about farming identity were still attractive.
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Anti-Semitism was central to extremists, who argued Jewish people controlled the banks
and had deliberately engineered the crisis. Farmers who joined these groups willing overlooked
or actively engaged in anti-Semitism. Jewish people were absent from the thoughts of Glencoe
residents in God’s Country until the 1985 ending. One interviewee said he was afraid of potential
violence by the Posse, but agreed that “the Jewish people control much of our markets.”105 This
disavowal of methods and agreement with ideas was a consistent cultural response to activism.
Farmers were told that “These Jews [responsible for the crisis] are not your Jew who lives next
door.”106 Most farmers did not know Jewish people personally and this allowed for further
abstraction and dehumanization. Although the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) found in 1986
that farmers were “very likely to hold anti-Semitic beliefs,” it was not because they were rural.107
Despite a small Jewish population, Minnesota was in the top twenty percent of states with antiSemitic hate crimes in 1983, which happened primarily in the Twin Cities.108
Though less overt than anti-Semitism, racism also shaped how farmers saw the crisis, as
Jesse Jackson’s visit to the Langman farm revealed. Newspapers did not report on it, but Dudley
said that “it was not uncommon to hear Jesse Jackson dismissed as ‘that nigger’ whom no one
‘wanted to see anyway.’”109 There were few Black people in rural Minnesota and no Black
farmers.110 One farmer said that Black people “just don’t like it” in Glencoe, though when
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pressed he admitted that “People are very prejudiced against blacks out here.”111 Anti-Semitism
and racism were prevelant in Minnesota; when combined with a homogenous population,
extremist groups flourished as a version of their ideas was already culturally accepted.
Extremist groups did not deliver on their promised solutions, while non-extremist groups
offered both “an alternative worldview and a concrete strategy to address farmers’ woes.”112
Foreclosure protests were not always successful, but they generated sympathy from the larger
culture. One notable strategy was penny auctions, a tactic from the Great Depression. Bidding
started at a penny and no one was allowed to bid higher. David Danbom argues that these were
often last-ditch efforts, “just desperate acts by desperate people,” because they required tacit
assent from police and potential bidders.113 During the 1980s, penny auctions seemed more
popular in Minnesota than elsewhere. At least one worked successfully, although a minimum bid
was typically set.114 In 1984, 11 year-old Tito Bates hoped to use this tactic with “a shiny penny
from his piggy bank” in order to buy back his parents’ farm equipment.115 He was denied, but the
use of the tactic spoke to hope in community.
This hope was particularly evident in the actions of women. They were the “backbone” of
activist movements, which reflected their cultural responsibility for the farm’s finances.116
Ramírez-Ferrero argues that the social rules for women allowed them to be less individualistic
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than men and be “the first ones who reached beyond the immediate family context for help.”117
Women overall may have been less attached to the land, as he asserts, but they were willing to
break social rules to stay when men felt paralyzed, even if it meant public shame.118 This may
have contributed to women’s importance in activist groups. Over half of Farm Advocate oral
histories were of women, with both male and female interviewees frequently referring to the
importance of women within the movement, particularly Lou Anne Kling and Anne Kanten.119
There were also female-specific activist groups. The most renowned was Women
Involved in Farm Economics (WIFE), whose members testified during the 1985 Farm Bill
hearings alongside three actresses who had portrayed farm wives. Activists in WIFE relied on “a
powerful, deliberately crafted trope that enabled activists to dispel negative stereotypes of rural
life while still appealing to deeply conservative elements that viewed women’s activism as
potentially threatening.”120 Although all farm activists used morality as the basis for their
argument, it was particularly strong in WIFE. There seems to be a division between female
activists in and outside of gender-specific groups. Women like Kling and Kanten did not base
their authority as activists on their gender, but on their role as farmers; women in WIFE did
precisely the opposite. WIFE was a more conservative group, which influenced their ideas about
gender, so their activism “existed alongside, and certainly not as a threat to, their prescribed roles
within the family.”121 Extremist groups were highly patriarchal. Several husbands wanted to
renounce their marriage certificates after they joined Chrisitan Identity groups because they were
117
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legal government documents; they decided to do this without taking their wives’ opinions into
account because they were the head of the family.122 Women were vital to activist movements,
but there was no single form of women’s activism.
Newspaper coverage did not accurately reflect the gender dynamics of activists, focusing
overwhelmingly on men. People interviewed as experts were often male or female counselors,
male clergy, and male farmers who had first-hand experience with losing their farms. When they
featured women, it was often in a tokenizing way, as women rather than activists. However, they
did occasionally print letters by female activists.123 Lawyer Jim Massey thought that “maybe
women have always been there…and we just haven’t seen them because the media, historically,
was looking for men.”124 Newspapers also overemphasized the extent to which farmers as a
whole participated in any activism. Despite what the newspapers wrote, activists were not seen
as genuine members of the community by those around them. Activism was a more exciting
topic than the daily lives of farmers, the same way that the Ruthton and Burr murders
overshadowed the wave of suicides to which they were tied. Protests were specific moments with
start and end dates that could be easily collapsed into a narrative.
Most people kept their heads down; Dudley reports that “less than 2 percent of
midwestern farmers took part in public protest during the 1980s, and that fewer than one in a
hundred joined political action groups.”125 Communities reinforced a belief that one should not
rock the boat. Many interviewees in the Farm Advocate Oral History Project described the
cultural tensions they faced. AAM member Anne Kanten recalled that she “got the message as a
kid growing up, that politics was kind of a nasty business. And nice folks didn’t dabble too much
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in that kind of stuff.”126 Sandy Hunz, Vice President of the Minnesota Women for Agricultural
and “token woman” on the Agricultural Advisory Committee in 1983, recalled that she stayed
away from Kling “because I thought she was real radical” since she did not work within the
system, saying that it was an issue that “they came into town and they were going to raise
hell…a lot of people cannot accept that.”127 The methods used were a sticking point for people
who otherwise agreed. Although activism could be radicalizing, that was not always the case.
Activism was a broad term that covered many behaviors, including community-wide social
welfare program sign-ups, foreclosure protests, and involvement in state politics. Communities
as a whole did not always distinguish between these behaviors, although protest was frequently
singled out as the worst, since it was seen as stirring up unnecessary trouble and making a fuss.
Tied to this value of maintaining the status quo was an element of blame. There was a
cultural belief that hard work led to success and a corresponding belief that those who did not
succeed had not worked hard.128 This was only worsened by complete silence on the existence of
the crisis within Minnesota until 1984.129 When asked about Jim Langman, a neighboring
farming couple said “He was just a very poor manager…A lot of good farmers knew what to do
and tightened up their belt and made it. He just never could do that.”130 As this quote shows,
success and failure were evaluated after they occurred. Langman’s failure is what excluded him
from the category of ‘good farmer;’ his behavior was retroactively reassessed to fit that
judgment. When failure did occur, men were expected to take responsibility for that loss. This
sentiment was consistently heard when non-activists were asked about those who had failed.
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Those who feel they have the potential to be victimized in the same way as a person they
are judging tend to recognize the effects of environment as well as individual actions, but this
was not always the case for farmers. This is possibly because of the cultural belief about hard
work in addition to the idea that activism was an external contagion rather than something
naturally occurring.131 When talking about the Langman protest discussed earlier in this section,
local banker Frank Tostrud argued that
It was a media show. They were largely people that had failed before this thing came
along. Not totally, but they were the ringleaders, the ones who got people worked up. So
it wasn’t something that the—what we call real people—paid much atten-tion to. It
wasn’t an appropriate way of addressing the problem. March in the street and talk
about—I don’t know what they talked about. I didn’t go to that thing.132
This is a revealing statement. Tostrud draws a firm line between those within and without the
community, arguing that activists are on the outside. Failure meant one should sit down and be
quiet; by becoming vocal, the Langmans violated community norms. He is correct that most of
those at the protest were not from Glenwood, although he admits a number of community
members attended. He then asserts that attendance in itself is also abnormal. Those locals who
attended can be absolved because their behavior is assumed to be influenced by charismatic
outside agitators, but it is still something that ‘real people’ did not do. Finally, he echoes Hunz’s
concerns about the method of protest. Since he did not attend the protest and hear Jesse Jackson
speak about building a coalition, it is the disruption to which he objects.
One Minnesota accountant argued that activists were motivated by “a case of sour
grapes.”133 He felt farmers wanted to make themselves feel better about their individual failure
by lashing out at systems that were, in the end, not at fault. While too simplistic to be correct,
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this argument does reveal a real psychological benefit that activists received. Activists pushed
themselves past the barrier of staying quiet about their problems while attempting to better their
lives. They had a similar reckoning with self-blame. One long-term benefit of membership in
activist groups was that farmers learned that they alone were not responsible for foreclosure; the
lenders and the government also bore responsibility.134 Activist groups stressed that “There’s
something structurally wrong with the agricultural economy. And it’s not their fault.”135 This
shift in beliefs was necessary for survival; the president of AAM’s Oklahoma chapter described
one man who accepted the dominant narrative of blame and died by suicide as a result.136
Avoidance further worsened farmers’ problems. Only by addressing them could they be
resolved, but many farmers felt unable to do so because of the cultural shame around failure.
Activists like Kling therefore found it vital to stress that “It’s not your fault. It’s the economic
times. But be proud of it and stand up and say, ‘I was in financial trouble and I took it on myself
and I did something about it.’”137 This gave farmers an alternate lens to view cultural ideas
through. The deeply ingrained shame they felt could be turned into a source of pride by focusing
on individualism and survival.138 Although many farmers in the following decades still asserted
that activists, unlike themselves, simply had not “[grown] up with a work ethic…[and] really
aren’t very good managers,” others began to accept the idea that they were not solely responsible
for the crisis.139 They may not have seen activists as part of their community, but the spread of
these ideas showed that they were psychologically useful.
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Activist groups and churches served similar functions. Farmers expressed a sense that
people no longer felt like part of a community. Farmers learned coping and healing strategies
from their time as activists, which they were then able to share.140 The communal aspect was
repeatedly stressed by activists. Being a farm advocate involved “being a neighbor again. Being
a community again. And helping each other instead of hoping your neighbor goes broke so you
can get his land.”141 Advocates found meaning in their volunteer status. They were “farmers
helping farmers” with no incentive other than rebuilding a sense of community that seemed
lost.142 Unlike churches, activist groups were less likely to feel isolating because they directly
addressed the crisis, which was the most beneficial coping technique.143
Farm crisis hotlines exemplify church-directed activism. Although Kanten was not alone
in her assessment that “the church is not in the middle of the fight here” like it was in Brazil, it
would be vital in getting people to utilize hotlines, even if they did not run them.144 Many AAM
members also worked with hotlines, since they “viewed their participation as a natural extension
of their work with the AAM—helping to keep families on the farm and using their own
experiences to help those in distress to reframe their experience and find some hope.”145 Farm
crisis hotlines were vital activist efforts, as they provided usable assistance to farmers while
piercing the bubble of isolation when churches were unable to do so.
There were several different broad categories of activism that responded to the farm crisis
in Minnesota, with a divide between extremist and non-extremist organizations, although some
in the latter category were more conservative than others. This particularly affected the strategies
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women used, and meant that they were easier to find in non-extremist organizations. All activism
primarily focused on preventing foreclosures, either through protest or through advice. Although
extremist groups were volatile, violence was rarely a reality. Anti-Semitism and racism played
key roles in farmers attitudes towards activism, though not always overtly. Newspaper coverage
prioritized activism over other responses to the crisis, since it was easy to construct a narrative
from and involved people who had already proved their willingness to speak out. This was not a
valued trait in most farm communities, and activists felt pressure to back down; they were
typically judged as sore losers. Activism was attractive to farmers not only because it extended
the possibility of keeping their farm, but because it offered a different mindset for thinking about
the causes of the crisis, which absolved them of sole blame.
Conclusion
People had many reactions to the 1980s farm crisis — including suicide, withdrawal from
religious spaces, and activism — that were informed by centuries of stereotypes about farmers.
Minnesotan farmers strongly believed individual hard work would be repaid by success; that
belief was challenged during the crisis, but still informed intra-community responses to
struggling farmers. Although the groundwork for the crisis had been laid over decades by the
productivity revolution, people were still blindsided by the arrival of the crisis after the
prosperous 1970s. Individuals were not affected alone; the central arguments of the farm crisis
relied on the cultural status of the family farm, and families were affected together.
Men, women, and children were all impacted by suicide, although men were much more
likely to take their own lives. For many people, suicidal ideation was rooted in their feelings of
responsibility; they consistently expressed the belief that they had failed because their farm had
failed. If the land was in their blood, what did it mean that they had lost it? Men were primarily
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responsible for the farm, which was often passed down by previous generations. This increased
the emotional weight of failure. Cultural expectations that men should be stoic further increased
the risk of suicide, since men felt unable to talk about their emotions and it was not acceptable to
seek help for mental health issues. Women also struggled under these expectations, although
they were often able to abandon pride for the survival of their family in a way that men were not;
they were also able to take off-farm jobs that bolstered the family’s income. Children and
teenagers felt suffocated by the silence around financial problems; even more than adults,
children assumed their family was the only one struggling.
Christianity greatly influenced farmers’ lives. A farm was a family legacy, but it was also
a contract made with God to steward and care for the land. Religion structured social life as well,
since churches were one of the main centers of community. Unfortunately, many struggling
farmers found them more isolating than not. Farmers tended to withdraw from community spaces
as their financial problems worsened because they felt too ashamed. This contributed to
worsening mental health issues as farmers were increasingly isolated.
Activism was a relatively rare response to the crisis; protest in particular was viewed
negatively by farming communities. As in many other areas of life, religion played a key role in
inspiring activism. Many activists applied Christian principles about helping their neighbors,
since they felt their churches were not doing enough. Foreclosure protests like the Langmans’
were a popular tactic since they were community events and drew media attention. Older tactics
like penny auctions were also re-adopted, although they were not often successful.
Responses frequently overlapped. Hotlines were activist efforts connected to suicide and
religion; they offered emotional support and practical advice, and were often operated by
churches. Suicide and activism also intersected at violence. There were two murder sprees that
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ended in suicides and an extremist edge to activism that would occasionally bubble over into
violence. Women were key to all three responses. They were typically more able to reach out for
support than men were; they were also able to utilize a cultural construction of farm wives that
positioned them as moral consciences to lend weight to their activism.
Community was at the center of each response. Although it may have felt true, farmers
were not solely responsible for their own success and failure. Churches were a vital area of
community, but during the crisis they did not provide the range and intensity of support needed.
Some people found a community in activist groups instead, where they did not feel like the crisis
was an isolated experience and were given the tools to understand the structures that governed it.
The historic ideal of individualism did not work well during the crisis, since it caused farmers to
view structural problems as individual ones to the detriment of their own health. This applied to
government support, particularly regarding food stamps and heat assistance, as well as the role of
the lenders and government policy in causing the crisis.
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